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i.  What is the issue? 
Pension reforms have been high on the political agenda in many developed countries 
over recent years and pension issues have been discussed intensely in the public as a 
result. In recent years, much effort has been devoted to make state, public and private 
pension systems fiscally more sustainable in the light of demographic change. In many 
developed countries, this has been achieved - at least ex ante - by encouraging greater 
private sector and personal involvement. Equally, many governments in emerging 
economies and developing countries have been pursuing their own pension reform 
agendas. 
 
Nevertheless, despite this spotlight on pensions, many important facets remain badly 
understood and need to be discussed in greater detail. Most observers would agree 
that societies have not yet reached the end of the reform process and that dealing with 
pensions may always remain “work in progress” as new information becomes available 
– such as on trends in life expectancy - and as societies evolve. Furthermore, 
additional effort will most likely be required to ensure that the desired outcomes will 
eventually materialise. 
 
Pensions Tomorrow intends to contribute to this much-needed debate on how to take 
pension systems forward – both in the UK and internationally – over the coming years 
by offering high-quality and timely analysis as well as independent peer-reviewed 
research. 
 
The purpose of this note is to ask some of the key questions that could inform future 
research into pensions. The general issue under consideration is not new. How to 
structure the future provision of pensions, taking into account wider economic, 
demographic and societal considerations at home and abroad? 
 
Most people are not aware that formal pensions for the many are a relatively recent 
phenomenon.
1 In the past, people worked and once they got older and could no longer 
work, their children looked after them. And once their children got old, their own 
children looked after them – in short, the family unit mattered. 
 
In the western world this informal arrangement fell apart more than 100 years ago. 
Partly in response, western societies created the welfare state (e.g. Bismarck’s 
introduction of the state pension in Germany in the 1880s), which provided a safety 
net through different means and also led to the creation of an industrial workforce with 
employment contracts rather than diffuse commitments within communities. But one 
should not forget that when the welfare state was created in many countries, life 
expectancy was hardly higher than the legal pension age – government outlays were 
limited. Bismarck’s Germany had a life expectancy of just over 50 years, so pensions 
from the age of 70 years onwards were a minimal fringe cost for the government. 
 
In recent decades, falling fertility rates and ever increasing life expectancy has put 
increased pressure on the welfare state in the developed world and many pension 
schemes – including both state and public sector – have been perceived to be 
unaffordable now, forcing governments to reconsider their policies. In some countries, 
strong inward migration is considered to be an appropriate policy response but closer 
scrutiny shows that this can hardly be a long-term strategy –at most, it gives policy 
makers some breathing space and a limited opportunity to postpone any hard 
decisions. 
 
Governments around the world have been dealing with this issue for years, 
international organisations, think tanks and trade unions have given advice, and 
 
 
1 The award of pensions itself dates back much further. Monarchies awarded pensions for services as far back 
as the Middle Ages though there were few beneficiaries. This was also a common practice in Roman times, 
with the last Western Roman Emperor Romulus Augustus being the last to be pensioned off when 




universities have provided valuable analysis. Societies have been dealing with this in 
their own particular ways, reflecting differences in cultural and historical backgrounds, 
and economic and demographic circumstances. Despite the closer integration of the 
world economy, in most countries, this issue has been treated as a domestic issue. 
 
The private sector has played its own important part in many countries by offering 
occupational pensions or by offering financial products, helping both the sponsors of 
pensions as well as individuals prepare financially for retirement. The fact that 
governments across the world have reduced ex ante their future fiscal burden by 
encouraging greater private sector and personal involvement does not mean though 
that this will also be ex post the eventual outcome. For the desired outcome to 
materialise, the private sector and personal involvement must develop as intended. 
Experience from around the world shows that this has not always been the case, 
requiring frequent and potentially costly policy changes and putting additional burdens 
on individuals and businesses alike. The complex interactions between fiscal policy and 
pension savings also play a role for both – an area touched on briefly later in this essay 
when we examine the role of tax relief. 
 
In a number of developed countries, for example, defined benefit pension plans have 
been closed to new members as scheme sponsors face increasing liabilities in the light 
of ever higher life expectancy and find the resulting regulatory funding requirements 
increasingly unaffordable. Does this trend require adjustments elsewhere in a country’s 
pension arrangements? Will today’s structures deliver the desired outcomes or do 
participants such as governments and financial markets need to innovate? 
 
There are a number of ways the issue of future pension provision could be approached. 
For example, one might want to think about the issue in terms of desirable objectives 
for a pension system such as: 
 
·  Efficiency (static and dynamic) 
·  Equity (fairness) 
·  Affordability and sustainability (both financial and social) 
 
These objectives could then be used as a core set of overlapping “lenses” when looking 
at the issue of future pension provision, though other “lenses” are feasible too. 
Importantly, as we shall demonstrate, these “lenses” can be used to study pensions 
simultaneously at a range of scales from large “big picture” macroeconomic themes 
such as political uncertainty to subtler, smaller scale but equally important issues such 
as the management of assets and liabilities for an individual pension fund. There is also 
the issue of credibility – in particular, political consistency – which cuts across all the 
lenses under consideration here and is touched on later in the essay. However, before 
doing so, this note provides some background on pension arrangements in developed 
and developing countries. 
ii.  Background 
Future trends in developed and developing countries 
Low fertility rates, ever increasing life expectancy and the ageing of the baby boom 
generation are putting increased financial pressure on the welfare state – be it for 
pensions, or health or long-term care - in the developed world. In most developed 
countries, governments have concluded that they can no longer afford the generous 
tax financed pay-as-you-go state pensions they have been offering in the past and 
have therefore reduced future entitlements. Increasing the state pension age has been 
one policy to achieve that. Another has been in several countries to introduce so-called 
“sustainability factors”, which automatically adjust future state pension entitlements as 
life expectancy evolves.
2 At the same time, many governments have boosted private 
 
 




sector involvement in the provision of pensions and introduced (or announced) pension 
products, which should make it easier for individuals to save for themselves.
3 
 
In addition, on a macroeconomic level, governments in many developed countries have 
reformed the labour markets to raise employment rates, particularly those of older 
workers, and consolidated the public finances by bringing down public debt and/or by 
accumulating assets




A cursory look at some of the main demographic trends in selected countries over the 
coming decades indicates that fertility rates are falling and life expectancy rising in 
developing countries as well.
6 Some – if not most – of them are growing old before 
they became rich enough to establish a welfare state. China is an obvious example and 
it could be argued that developing countries are facing even bigger challenges than 
developed countries in providing retirement incomes in the future. For example, how 
should China deal with the issue of the closing down of state-owned firms, which at 
least in the past offered some type of safety net, and how should it deal with its rapidly 
ageing population – partly the result of the country’s “one child policy”?
7 
 
What about the oil-rich societies of the Arabian peninsular, which currently have the 
financial means to support generous welfare systems but are faced with the depletion 
of their oil reserves in the coming decades? How will they prepare for the ageing of 
their (currently) still young but often under-educated populations? For example, Table 
1 in Appendix A shows that the old-age dependency ratio is projected to increase by 
more in absolute terms in the United Arab Emirates than in many developed countries. 
 
One should not see the trends in the developed and developing world as separate 
events. In some developed countries, strong inward migration is considered to be one 
appropriate policy response to an ageing population – whatever the true merits of such 
a policy. Inward migration to the developed world is mirrored by outward migration 
from the developing world. What are the economic consequences of these migration 
flows for the recipient and origin countries? 
 
Equally, what are the challenges and opportunities created by sovereign wealth funds 
for the developed and developing world? What opportunities and challenges arise from 
the fact that societies are at different stages of the ageing process and with longevity 
increasing at different rates? Does the optimal structure of pension provision depend 
on what other countries are doing in this area? 
iii.  Providing for income in retirement: the bigger picture 
Given that family networks no longer play a major role in looking after the elderly in 
developed countries and are rapidly weakening in developing countries and emerging 
economies, societies need to find other ways to organise themselves to support the 
old. 
 
Roughly speaking the choices are that: 
 
·  individuals look after themselves 
 
 
3 Examples include the so-called Kiwi Saver in New Zealand, the Riester Rente in Germany or the personal 
pension accounts in the UK, to be introduced in 2012. 
4 The list of countries that have substantial government-owned assets includes Canada, Denmark, Sweden, 
Australia and New Zealand. These assets are often held in pension funds. 
5 In the European Union, member states have been encouraged to pursue a “three-pronged approach” to the 
ageing problem: reform the welfare state, boost trend growth and consolidate the public finances. See 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: The long-
term sustainability of public finances in the EU, European Commission (2006) 574, 2006. 
6 See Table 1 in Appendix A. 
7 The Graying of the middle kingdom: the demographics and economics of retirement policy in China, Centre 




·  firms provide pensions as part of their remuneration package 
·  Government organises it, using the whole range of instruments available to it 
·  Other key players such as the financial markets and labour unions fill the gap 
 
Most countries use a mixture of all four approaches. Within a country, the dominant 
approach will vary by socio-economic group. For example, in the UK, around half of all 
pensioners rely entirely on the Government’s state pensions and millions more draw a 
public service pension. The former group of people will have had relatively low lifetime 
earnings and are likely to have worked for businesses that do not offer pensions. The 
latter will have worked, for example, for the civil service or as teachers. The 
importance of the state pension in providing income in retirement declines for higher 
socio-economic groups. For these groups, occupational and private pension schemes 
become more important. In other countries – especially in continental Europe - the role 
of government is bigger for larger parts of society. 
 
All the above approaches have the same aim: to ensure that future retirees (who will 
generally no longer be working) will be able to claim a share of future production 
(generated either by those working or from an asset base) for their own consumption 
purposes. A simple tax-financed, pay-as-you-go state pension system could achieve 
this as could a setup in which individuals save for their retirement. However, each 
raises questions that need to be debated. 
 
Should all agents – individuals, business and government – be responsible? If yes, how 
should responsibility be allocated? Should government provide generous state pensions 
for all its citizens? Or should firms be responsible for the pensions of their employees 
by, for example, running defined benefit pension schemes? Or should individuals be 
responsible for their own pensions, for example by paying into personal pension 
accounts or other types of savings? 
 
In 2004, the Indian Government introduced a defined contribution pension scheme for 
public sector employees and is tabling a Bill in late 2008 to allow banks in the private 
sector to manage some of these government pension assets – an unusual and bold 
step. However, this also opens up further questions. How should such a selection 
process be implemented? How can the government ensure that pensioners – present 
and future – get the best deal? What are the incentives for the banks and how will the 
government ensure these are aligned with individuals? What are the contingencies and 
who will ultimately be responsible financially should one of these providers get into 
trouble? 
 
The different approaches have their respective strengths and weaknesses, for example, 
with respect to their impact on the growth potential of the economy
8 or – partly related 
– the allocation of risk. In addition, there are major issues of intra-generational and 
intergenerational fairness to be considered. 
 
None of the questions can be answered in isolation. As the following chart of a stylised 
economy shows, individuals, firms and government all play important roles and are all 













8 And hence the size of future production that could be shared. 
9 For simplicity, the chart ignores the international side of the economy though a simple schematic extending 































Government, individuals and firms are equally important agents. Individuals interact 
with firms and the Government in the labour market, and in the goods and services 
market. Individuals offer labour, while firms and the Government (the public sector) 
demand labour. With the help of labour and capital, Government and firms produce 
goods and services that are consumed by individuals (e.g. health care and cars). 
 
Firms in the financial markets are not different from other firms in the sense that they 
also use labour and capital to produce goods and services, which are consumed by 
economic agents. However, the financial markets are shown explicitly here as they play 
a particular role in the pension issue and could well provide some of the solutions. 
 
Government also plays a special role as it interacts with individuals and firms not only 
through the factor, and goods and services markets but also through other channels. 
For example, government decides on the lifetime net transfers between an individual 
and the state (which includes taxation) or sets the parameters, which determines 
labour market outcomes (e.g. migration). It can also tax and regulate firms and shape 
the competitive environment by, for example, imposing import barriers. 
 
The chart shows a snapshot in time and is therefore static. Over time, small differences 
in interactions could lead to different outcomes though. For example, slightly more 
government spending on health could lead to an increase in life expectancy, which in 
turn would affect demand for goods and services, and labour supply. Firms that 
provide defined benefit pension schemes to their employees might over time develop 
different business plans from those developed by firms without defined benefit 
schemes. Over time, one type of firm might invest more in research and development, 
might become more innovative and might contribute more to economic growth. This in 
turn would affect the government’s tax base and hence the government’s choice set for 
lifetime net transfers to citizens. And so it goes on. This simple example illustrates how 
important it will be to examine the bigger picture with all its myriad constituents and 
study the dynamic, longer-term effects of different pension arrangements. 
iv.  Objectives 
What characteristics should the desired outcomes have? As mentioned, three potential 
objectives for the provision of pensions in a society could be: 
Chart 1 
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·  Efficiency (static and dynamic) 
·  Equity (fairness) 
·  Affordability and sustainability (both financial and social) 
 
This list is not exhaustive – other objectives such as “simplicity” could be added for 
example – but likely uncontroversial. However, this is not to say that uncontroversial 
equals unchallenging. This next section discusses these objectives in more detail. The 
objectives are then used as “lenses” to study a number of key issues and case studies. 
Efficiency (static and dynamic) 
An economy is (statically) efficient if the available resources are allocated in such a 
way that productive capacity is maximised. Dynamic efficiency goes further and 
requires that the growth potential is maximised. In other words this concept goes 
beyond the mere allocation of existing resources today. 
 
Given the time horizons relevant to pensions, dynamic efficiency is arguably the more 
relevant concept. The key drivers of economic growth are labour, capital and 
technological progress (productivity). The supply of labour can increase as a result of a 
larger share of people of working age participating in the labour market or by an 
increase in the size of the working-age population itself. The quality of the labour force 




Capital – physical, knowledge, social and financial – is provided by the public and 
private sectors. For most pensions, increasing longevity and an imperfect knowledge of 
how to manage assets and liabilities together has led to large deficits in the private 
sector and large mostly unfunded public liabilities in many countries. This has placed 
additional pressure on individuals, who are being gradually moved towards holding 
investment risk; corporate sponsors, who are finding that funding pressures and 
demands for older schemes are increasingly burdensome for shareholders and 
management; and governments, who are faced with the prospect of an increasing tax 
burden. The gap between social promises and fiscal reality is increasingly unaffordable 
for both firms and governments, and the scale of existing deficits and increased 
funding pressures make it likely that new ways of optimising this capital such as 
public-private partnerships will need to be found. 
 
Over the long term, however, the key driver to economic growth will continue to be 
Productivity growth. Productivity growth is the result of innovations arising from 
spending on research and development but can also be in the form of non-
technological innovation, the latter perhaps reflecting new organisational structures, 
which allow for more efficient processes. 
 
Innovation and the resulting efficiency can also be seen within the pensions arena. In 
the Netherlands, for example, the aggregation of small pension schemes and the 
growing popularity of fiduciary management have led to a marked decline in scheme 
deficits. Similarly, in the UK, the advent of the pension buyout market has provided a 
way for occupational defined benefit pension schemes to tap into the private capital 
markets and secure their benefits with a regulated third party. This has also led to 
greater benefits for companies, allowing them to remove otherwise potentially 
unconstrained liabilities from their balance sheets and producing greater cash-flow for 
investment and shareholder distributions. On a more macroeconomic scale, it could be 
argued that different pension arrangements across the public and private sectors might 
affect the allocation of labour across these sectors and as a result might affect long-
term productivity growth. 
 
 
10 The “endogenous growth theory” has studied the relationship between, inter alia, education and economic 
growth. The relationship between institutional design and economic growth could also be studied in this 





A key principle should be that a pension system is fair. A system which is fair and – 
importantly – also perceived to be fair will be more readily accepted by society than a 
system which is not. However, what constitutes “fairness”? Should it be defined as 
fairness across generations or within generations? Should the fairness of a government 
policy for an individual be judged on a snapshot in time or over the lifetime of that 
individual? Should fairness be defined in terms of opportunities or outcomes? How fair 
are different types of occupational pension schemes? 
 
There are also questions of fairness within pension schemes. For example, in the UK, 
there is a growing divide between public sector pensions and those in the private 
sector. The former enjoy generous defined benefit schemes that are mostly unfunded, 
while the latter are being slowly but certainly pushed towards a money purchase 
system as companies close their occupational pension schemes to new membership. 
Investment risk is now being transferred to the individual so that the ultimate size of 
their pension depends on the performance of financial markets. 
 
Just take the example of two people, one born one year after the other. Both have 
similar careers and prepare similarly for retirement. The only difference is that the first 
individual retires and converts his fund into an annuity just before a stock market fall, 
whereas the second individual will have to live with the fall. Is this just “tough luck”? 
 
Similarly, as another example, in many defined benefit schemes, the value of a 
pension to a more senior staff member is often greater than the value of lifetime 
contributions made by the person in question, as wage progression often accelerates 
for these individuals towards the end of the career. In contrast, rank-and-file workers 
generally see a gradual and steady increase in wages over the course of a career. Does 
this mean that to some extent, their contributions are effectively subsidising the higher 
pensions for management? 
Affordability/sustainability 
The “affordability” or “sustainability” of pension systems can be interpreted in several 
ways. First, it can be interpreted in terms of fiscal/financial sustainability. Can 
governments afford to pay a rising share of GDP on pensions in the future when they 
will also likely have to spend more on health and long-term care? Where would the 
revenue to finance this additional spending come from? 
 
Alternatively, in which areas could spending be reduced to make room for increased 
state pension spending? Governments and international organisations have done 
substantial work over recent years to estimate future spending trends and to assess 
whether the public finances might be sustainable in the long-term.
11 In Europe, the 
European Commission nowadays takes into account long-term public finance trends in 
its annual assessment of member states’ public finances in the context of the St ability 
and Growth Pact. 
 
“Sustainability” could also be interpreted in terms of “social sustainability”, which links 
back to fairness issues. Governments will only be able to pursue their announced 
policies in the long term if they have the backing of the electorate to do so. 
 
Business might interpret “affordability” and “sustainability” yet differently. In a labour 
market in which “jobs for life” are gradually disappearing and faced with rapid – and 
importantly in magnitude unexpected - increases in life expectancy, many businesses 
have concluded that they can no longer “afford” or “sustain” their existing pension 
schemes in the future. The rapid closure of defined benefit pension schemes over 
recent years in several countries is the result of such a judgement. 
 
 
11 The impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU25 Member States on pensions, health 
care, long-term care, education and unemployment transfers (2004-2050) Report prepared by the Economic 




v.  Using the Lenses 
Many key issues can be seen through a combination of the above outlined lenses and 
can be viewed at a variety of increasingly granular levels. Here, we briefly outline some 
areas deserving of further research, though this is not intended to be an exhaustive list 
of what the Pensions Tomorrow initiative may look at. 
Longevity 
Setting up an efficient, fair and sustainable pension system is a major challenge and 
might never fully be achieved. The challenge is made larger still by the fact that 
longevity trends – and hence one of the key parameters determining the size of the 
challenge – are not well understood. Actual increases in life expectancy have generally 
been much more substantial than previously assumed in official population projections, 
with the result that government, business, the financial markets and individuals had to 
readjust their behaviours and plans. In hindsight, previous behaviours turned out to be 
suboptimal. It should, therefore, be a priority to improve the understanding of future 
longevity trends. 
 
For individuals, increased longevity is desirable and not surprisingly, therefore, most 
developed societies spend a significant percentage of GDP annually on healthcare and 
medical research to ensure that we all have longer and healthier lives. As the 
population ages, this share is projected to increase over the coming decades and 
governments will have to ensure that the public finances will remain sustainable and 
government policy inter-generationally fair. Equally, increases in longevity can lead to 
large unanticipated costs for business and there is substantial evidence that this is 
adversely affecting the finances of pension funds and their sponsors.
12 
 
Sponsors and trustees are increasingly concerned about longevity as the recent trend 
for life expectancies has been ever upwards and to make things more complicated, the 
extent of future increases is also highly uncertain. Another fundamental problem is that 
for most schemes, liabilities are calculated insufficiently frequently, using out of date 
longevity assumptions and increasing the risk of unexpected future increases in 
liabilities. 
 
In recent times, the area has become all the more important because of increased 
regulatory scrutiny in the UK and elsewhere, and growing pressure for schemes to 
adopt more realistic mortality assumptions that reflect the latest scientific evidence – a 
change that could significantly increase their total liabilities by 3% or more for every 
added year of life expectancy. This also presents additional shorter-term risks for 
corporate sponsors as they may be ordered by regulators to divert extra cash into the 
scheme to meet these future liabilities via a contribution notice. 
 
It is hardly surprising then that managing this risk and its consequences has hitherto 
been far from straightforward and more research is needed to understand the issues 
better. The role financial markets can play in managing and mitigating this risk is also 
deserving of further study. The growth of a robust market in catastrophe bonds to 
manage the risk from natural and man-made disasters is evidence that idiosyncratic 
but crippling risks can be managed effectively. Recent steps have been made with 
companies launching longevity indices and hedging products but this is only the start. 
 
Fundamentally, who should carry the longevity risk and does the allocation of this risk 
make a difference to the dynamic efficiency of the economy? Can longevity risk be 
hedged effectively and how would one construct a longevity index acceptable to 
everyone? Can firms be actually effectively insured against future longevity increases 
by the financial markets? 
 
 
12 Over the last decade, new accounting standards have greatly increased transparency with respect to the 
effects of increased longevity on pension fund finances. Many occupational pension funds are also at risk due 
to the presence of spousal benefits should the main beneficiary die, which can enhance the longevity of the 
fund. For example, the American Civil War Veterans Pension Fund made its last payment in 2001, nearly 140 





On a more granular level, the latter question also goes to the heart of the hidden risk 
run by many defined benefit pension schemes – the lack of a holistic approach when 
dealing with the assets and liabilities within these schemes. While commentators have 
focused in great detail on the losses suffered by banks from the unwinding of the credit 
cycle over 2007-08, much less attention has been paid to those institutions which 
supplied large amounts of wholesale funding to banks at very low rates by buying 
bonds and have suffered major losses as a consequence. 
 
Pension funds top this list. In the UK, for example, pension fund lending to UK financial 
institutions, through purchase of their bonds, is estimated to have risen by a factor of 
forty times from £2 billion in 2000 to £80 billion by 2008. This capital in turn was used 
by banks to fund excessive loan growth. When the value of bank debt and bank equity 
collapsed, many pension schemes suffered twice – both through the marking down of 
their assets and by a sharp increase in their estimated future liabilities, due to lower 
discount rates as gilt yields fell in response to the impending economic slowdown. The 
spreading of the contagion into the real economy and its impact on the equity and 
bond markets as a whole only exacerbated this further. 
 
The majority of pension fund trustees are inexperienced in investments and are 
simplistic in their approach. Liabilities are calculated typically once a year, using 
longevity assumptions and a discount rate often implicitly linked to the assumed return 
on pension assets. The assets are then invested in traditional instruments such as 
corporate bonds to create large matching portfolios to address the duration mismatch 
between the pension liabilities and assets. The rest of the assets are then invested in 
some broad return seeking asset classes - typically equities and these days, a small 
allocation to newer asset classes such as hedge funds – in the belief that despite their 
volatility, their returns over the long term are sufficient enough to meet all the 
liabilities and compensate for longevity risk. 
 
The problems with this approach, however, are manifold. The liabilities are calculated 
insufficiently frequently; the longevity assumptions used are often out of date; and 
most importantly, the discount rates vary from scheme to scheme, often presenting a 
less than prudent valuation of the true costs of delivering pensioners full financial 
security. The problem is that trustees are effectively banking on an uncertain set of 
future gains to pay off their obligations to millions of pensioners – current and future – 
across the country. 
 
The above approach also ignores the fact that markets are fundamentally unpredictable 
and blind faith in long-term outcomes is often a poor steer. Risk is a broad term with 
many different constituents and avoiding the pitfalls should be the key driver behind 
any sensible investment policy implemented. Fundamentally, the level of risk taken 
within a scheme should be a tailored one that seeks to hedge out all risks that could 
disproportionately impact the asset-liability mismatch – the key metric of the scheme’s 
solvency. Further, where the risks cannot be almost entirely hedged, they need to be 
managed in the most efficient manner, i.e. ensuring that the levels of risk taken do not 
adversely impact the asset-liability mismatch in any significant manner should markets 
turn suddenly. 
 
Markets change everyday and so do the risks associated with them. Yet, beyond the 
market risks monitored by others, there are a number of hidden ones such as interest 
rates, inflation, currency fluctuations and asset class correlations. In a recessionary 
environment, the weakness of corporate sponsors’ covenants will be exacerbated and 
there is a danger that these levels of excessive risk can cause pension funds to fail and 
potentially even drag down sponsors if they are unable to honour their covenants. This 
can seriously damage the interests of pensioners, workers, shareholders and 
taxpayers, raising the question of how the provision of pensions affects the business 
behaviour of sponsoring firms as well as their relationship pension trustees. 
 
Are today’s governance and other structures well placed to deliver over the coming 




loosened on pension funds and pension insurance providers due to their longer time 
horizons? Can firms be effectively insured against future pension liabilities by the 
financial markets and can this be extended to individuals with personal pensions? What 
about the role of government safety nets such as the Pension Protection Fund in the 
UK? 
The Nature of Tax Relief 
Tax relief is a key part of government plans to encourage individuals to take a greater 
role in saving for retirement. As an example, the British Government currently 
supports the provision of old-age pensions in two ways: direct public expenditure on 
state provided pensions and ‘indirect’ expenditure through tax relief on private 
occupational and personal pensions. 
 
For the latter, the tax relief takes three main forms. First, individuals can claim back 
any tax paid on contributions to their pension fund by either themselves or their 
employers. Second, pension funds receive tax relief on their investment income. Last, 
the lump sum component of any pension payment – currently 25% – is tax free. 
 
The rationale is simple – by providing financial incentives which increases the return on 
saving, the Government hopes to encourage people to save more for their 
retirement.
13 This is because of the perceived benefits of saving to make people 
financially more secure in old age and more pragmatically from the Government’s 
perspective, as it reduces projected state pension expenditure in the long term. 
 
However, there is little evidence that these tax incentives have actually increased the 
overall level of private saving, particularly for lower income groups, with most of the 
pension saving at the cost of other forms of saving. Various explanations have been 
advanced such as the complexity of tax incentives; their lack of appeal to lower 
earners, who pay lower rates of tax and therefore, gain relatively less from reduced tax 
liabilities; and to myopia affecting many individuals’ long-term decision making. It is 
this savings gap
14 – the Government’s own figures estimate that up to 13 million 
people may be under-saving – that have led to the impending introduction of Personal 
Accounts and it remains to be seen whether this will solve the problem. 
 
However, the failure of tax incentives to close this gap is all the more interesting when 
the UK is compared to New Zealand, for example, where the lack of tax incentives has 
apparently not resulted in a savings gap, with a quarter of the workforce having 
individual private pensions. This raises important questions of policy. Is the present 
system in the UK the best way of helping private pension provision or could alternative 
structures of tax relief do the job better? 
 
The current system may also be seen to be inequitable and highly regressive from 
some perspectives due to the tiered structure of income tax. Although all taxpayers 
pay for the tax incentive system, the benefits are greater for higher earners due to 
their higher marginal rates of tax, creating the paradoxical situation where higher 
earners receive more state support for their private pension contributions. They are 
also more likely to contribute, accentuating the inequity further. Consequently, just 
over half of the tax relief is received by 2.5 million higher rate tax payers. 
 
The problem is compounded by the growing cost of this tax relief on the Exchequer. 
While tax relief today is often seen as tax deferred tomorrow, this is not necessarily the 
case as the system has distinct tax advantages. First, individuals can elect take a 
proportion of pension monies accrued as a tax free lump sum at retirement. Second, 
they may well have received tax relief at a higher rate than is paid on the pension 
received in retirement. 
 
 
13 It should be noted that tax relief is also provided in the form of ISAs, PEPs and TESSAs to encourage 
people to save generally. 
14 The difference between the amount people need to save annually to achieve what is considered to be a 





The net result is potentially a growing loss of revenues to the Government and a 
growing subsidy by the present taxpayer. According to the Inland Revenue’s latest 
numbers for 2006-07, the cost of relief was 1.6% of GDP – an increase of 87% since 
1998-99. There are also additional costs for the relief from National Insurance 
Contributions on employers’ pension contributions. This is significant, as it represents 
about 25% of the cost of all state pensions and retirement benefits. With the 
impending introduction of Personal Accounts where people will have to choose to opt-
out of a private pension, the costs of relief may rise significantly further. 
 
What part has the rapid growth of high income jobs – in the financial sector, for 
example – played in this rising cost of relief? Can governments financially afford to pay 
– directly or indirectly – pensions? Can they socially afford not to pay? 
Political Uncertainties and Time Inconsistency 
Equally, as household structures and the business environment change, work patterns 
evolve and even what societies perceive to be “fair” is likely to change over time. 
Pursuing the objectives mentioned earlier must be done within the constraints imposed 
by these inevitable uncertainties. In other words, a successful pension system should 
at least be reasonably robust to these changes. 
 
Without doubt, future societal or economic developments will require policy changes 
though, however good the intentions of today’s policy makers and other agents. A 
“good” pension system should therefore enable politicians to make these changes 
without having to restart fundamental debates at every opportunity. Politicians must 
also be in the position to make these changes without “losing face”. The worry to “lose 
face” – even when no blame can be put on the politicians - is a major obstacle to 
reform efforts in a democratic society.
15 
 
Another major challenge will be to ensure that the objectives will be reached not only 
in theory ex ante but also in practice ex post. Even if it were theoretically possible to 
devise a structure today that led to efficient, fair and affordable pension provision in 
the future, how can economic agents - government, business or individuals - today 
ensure that they themselves or future economic agents will be committed to these 
plans in years to come? Given the time horizons involved, major time inconsistency 
problems exist. What mechanisms could help to overcome these obstacles? Less 
research has been conducted on these “practicalities” than on the theory.
16 
 
Ultimately at least some basic responsibility will arguably always lie with government 
as, first, society will generally not accept that individuals live in extreme poverty and, 
second, democratic processes will allow special interest groups (including the “elderly”) 
to influence future election outcomes. The more they are disappointed by future 
outcomes, the more organised and vocal they are likely to become and hence the more 
likely they will be able to influence future election outcomes in their favour. While ex 
ante responsibility might lie with individuals or the private sector (firms), ex post the 
responsibility will almost certainly fall back to government if other arrangements fail to 
deliver as expected. 
vi.  A Final Note 
One final major issue to note in this context is the credibility of behaviours over the 
30- to 50-year time horizon. For example, how credible are the promises made by 
today’s politicians on future state pensions? While “Government” will exist in the 
future, the political actors will have changed over the long term and different parties 
might be in power. Commitment can therefore only come through institutions and not 
through individual politicians. But which opposition party feels obliged to honour the 
promises made by their predecessor once they move into office? 
 
 
15 For example, a government might be forced to change its policy because new information emerges. 
16 See for example, Credible Pensions, Tim Besley and Andrea Pratt 





Does this suggest that political decisions that affect society for decades to come should 
be made by cross-party committees rather than a governing party? 
 
Future politicians can renege on social promises made in the past in the light of future 
political pressures. How can Government ensure that today’s policies will be 
implemented? What are the appropriate governance structures for government-run 
pension funds? 
 
Are social promises enough or are legal contracts required? Should responsibility be 
moved to other actors such as central banks (as in the case of the Norwegian Oil 
Fund), which could run state pension funds, or even the financial services industry 
through public-private partnerships? 
 
Equally, how credible is it for working-age individuals of a large cohort to accept the 
pension promises made towards them once they actually reach retirement age? What 
incentives do they have to stick to previous agreements? Will these individuals not try 
to minimise their net transfers to the Government at a cost to other cohorts by 
demanding low taxes now while they work but high pensions and generous healthcare 
provisions once they reach retirement? Large enough cohorts (e.g. baby boomers) are 
powerful enough to renegotiate ex post the property rights through the democratic 
process. 
 
Finally, how credible is it for private-sector firms to guarantee pension entitlements in 
the future, including to former employees who left the business years or even decades 
ago? Has this credibility changed as a result of fewer “jobs for life”, which has 
fundamentally changed the contract between employer and employee? Is it not 
attractive for firms to default on their promises, in the hope that Government will take 
on ultimate responsibility? What – if any – contract exists between firms and 
Government? 
 
As befits such a complex topic, the questions and problems are clearly difficult and 
many. The answers are few and it is hoped Pensions Tomorrow will provide a forum to 





Table 1 summarises some of the main demographic trends in selected countries over 
the coming decades. 
 










5  2005  2030  2050  2005  2030  2050 
Australia  1.79  1.85  1.85  78.9  82.0  84.1  19  35  41 
Brazil  2.25  1.92  1.85  68.8  73.1  76  9  19  31 
China  1.73  1.85  1.85  71.3  74.8  77.4  11  24  39 
Germany  1.36  1.54  1.74  76.5  79.1  81.4  28  46  54 
France  1.89  1.85  1.85  77.1  79.6  81.8  25  38  45 
India  2.81  1.97  1.85  63.2  69.3  73.4  8  13  21 
Italy  1.38  1.54  1.74  77.5  79.9  82.1  30  44  60 
Japan  1.27  1.4  1.6  79  81.5  83.3  30  52  74 
Mexico  2.21  1.85  1.85  73.7  77.2  78.9  9  18  34 
Russia  1.34  1.51  1.71  59  64  68.5  19  28  39 
South 
Africa 
2.64  2.13  1.85  48.8  55.3  61.2  7  12  14 
UAE  2.31  1.95  1.85  77.2  79.6  81.9  1  6  27 
UK  1.82  1.85  1.85  77.2  79.6  81.9  24  35  40 
USA  2.02  1.85  1.85  75.6  77.9  80.4  18  31  34 
1 Life expectancy at birth, males. The overall trend is similar for females. 
2 This is 
defined as the number of people aged 65 years and over as a share of those 
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